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Abstract. Scientiﬁc and business communities present unprecedented
requirements on provenance, where the provenance of some data item is
the process that led to that data item. Previous work has conceived a
computer-based representation of past executions for determining prove-
nance, termed process documentation, and has developed a protocol,
PReP, to record process documentation in service oriented architectures.
However, PReP assumes a failure free environment. Failures lead to pro-
cess documentation unable to be recorded, losing the evidence that a
process occurred. This is not acceptable in the applications relying on
process documentation and would cause disastrous consequences. This
paper describes our solution, F PReP, a protocol for recording process
documentation in the presence of failures. A complete formalisation of
the protocol using Abstract State Machines is also presented.
1 Introduction
In scientiﬁc and business communities, a wide variety of applications have pre-
sented unprecedented requirements [20] for knowing the provenance of their data
products, e.g., where they originated from and what has happened to them since
creation. In chemistry experiments, provenance is used to detail the procedure by
which a material is generated, allowing the material to be patented. In healthcare
applications, in order to audit if proper decisions were made for a patient, there
is a need to trace back the origins of these decisions. In engineering manufactur-
ing, keeping track of the history of generated data in simulations is important
for users to analyse the derivation of their data products. In ﬁnance business,
the provenance of some data item establishes the origin and authenticity of the
data item produced by ﬁnancial transactions, enabling reviewers and auditors
to verify if these transactions are compliant with speciﬁc ﬁnancial regulations.
To meet these requirements, Groth et al. [15] have proposed an open architec-
ture to record and access a computer-based representation of past executions,
termed process documentation, which can be used for determining the provenance
of data. A generic recording protocol, PReP [16], has been developed to provide
interoperable means for recording process documentation in the context of ser-
vice oriented architectures. In this architecture, process documentation consists
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of a set of assertions (termed p-assertions)m a d eb yasserting actors (i.e., either
clients or services) involved in a process (i.e., the execution of a workﬂow). A
dedicated repository, termed provenance store, is used to maintain p-assertions.
For scalability reason, multiple provenance stores may be employed and process
documentation may end up distributed, linked by pointers recorded along with
p-assertions in each store. Using the pointer chain, distributed process documen-
tation can be retrieved from one store to another.
Recording process documentation in the presence of failures is an issue that
has been lacking attention so far. PReP assumes a system in which no failure
occurs. However, large scale, open distributed systems are not failure-free [8,9].
For example, a service may not be available and network connection may be
broken. The presence of failures may prevent process documentation from being
recorded, losing the evidence that a process occurred. We now draw a parallel
between the documentation of a process and a particular type of evidence in a
legal setting, testimony. The absence of testimony from eyewitnesses to a crime
scene would make it diﬃcult for juries to make a judgement about whether
to believe the set of claims provided by a suspect. Similarly, the unavailability
of process documentation is not acceptable in the above domains that rely on
process documentation to determine the provenance of their data products. It
may also cause disastrous consequences as in the example of a provenance-based
service billing system. In this system, users are charged according to their usage
of services described by process documentation. If a user invoked a service, but
documentation fails to describe this invocation, then the user will be charged
too little, which must be avoided.
To address this problem, we have designed a recording protocol, F PReP,
which provides remedial actions and a novel component, Update Coordinator,
to guarantee the recording of process documentation in the case of failures. The
protocol has been formalised as an abstract state machine and its correctness
has been proved. This paper details the protocol and presents its formalisation.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces some termi-
nology and identiﬁes a set of requirements that the protocol should meet. Section
3 states our failure assumptions and deﬁnes protocol messages. In Section 4, we
present a formalisation of the protocol and detail the protocol’s behaviour. Then
we outline the proof of the protocol’s correctness in Section 5. Finally, Section
6 discusses related work, followed by a conclusion in Section 7.
2 Terminology and Requirements
2.1 Terminology
Process documentation describes a past process that led to a result. Such a
p r o c e s si sm o d e l l e da sac a usally connected set of interactions between actors
involved in that process [14]. An interaction is concerned with one application
message exchanged between two actors, i.e., its sender and its receiver. An actor
documents an interaction by making p-assertions to provide a sender or receiver’s198 Z. Chen and L. Moreau
view of the interaction. Process documentation therefore consists of a set of p-
assertions.
A p-assertion can document the application message exchanged in an inter-
action (interaction p-assertion) or the internal state of an actor (actor state
p-assertion), such as time and memory usage, in the context of an interaction.
It can also be a relationship p-assertion, capturing the internal causal connec-
tions between interactions within the scope of an actor, i.e., the interaction where
an output message is sent (eﬀect interaction) and the interaction where an input
message is received (cause interaction).
PReP speciﬁes that both actors in an interaction must make p-assertions doc-
umenting the interaction for accountability or veriﬁcation purposes. For scalabil-
ity reason, an actor can use various stores to record p-assertions about diﬀerent
interactions, though p-assertions about the same interaction must be recorded
in the same place. Besides, the p-assertions made by the two actors in an inter-
action are also allowed to be recorded in two diﬀerent stores. A notion of link,
i.e., a pointer to a provenance store, has been introduced to connect distributed
documentation [14].
There are two types of links, viewlink and causelink.I ft h et w oa c t o r si na n
interaction use two diﬀerent stores, each actor records a viewlink that points to
the provenance store where the opposite party recorded their p-assertions about
that interaction. Therefore, both views of an interaction can be retrieved by
navigating from one provenance store to the other. The causelink is used in re-
lationship p-assertions. If the p-assertions that represent a cause interaction are
recorded in a diﬀerent provenance store, a causelink is embedded in the relation-
ship p-assertion, indicating which provenance store the p-assertions representing
the cause interaction are stored in. To facilitate the description of our protocol,
we deﬁne a term ownlink as a pointer to the provenance store where an actor
records its own p-assertions.
Figure 1 shows an example of how links are recorded. Actor A sends an appli-
cation message M2 to actor B as a consequence of message M1. A uses provenance
stores PR and PA to record p-assertions about the interactions in which M1 and
M2 are exchanged, respectively. B records p-assertions about the receipt of M2
in provenance store PB. In order to exchange a viewlink to B, A includes its
ownlink to PA in M2. B then extracts the link and records it as its viewlink in
PB. As a result, a viewlink from PB to PA is created (shown by the arc VL 1). We
assume that A knows from its conﬁguration that B always stores its p-assertions
in PB. Hence, A records a viewlink to PB in PA. Finally, A makes a relationship
p-assertion between its eﬀect interaction containing M2 and the previous cause
interaction containing M1. In the relationship p-assertion, it adds a causelink to
PR, where the p-assertions related to the cause interaction are stored. A then
records the relationship p-assertion in PA, thus connecting PA to PR shown by
the arc CL.
By recording links, a pointer chain can be formed connecting all the prove-
nance stores hosting the documentation of a process. Using the pointer chain,
distributed documentation can be retrieved from one store to another.Recording Process Documentation in the Presence of Failures 199
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2.2 Requirements
Miles et al. [20] have presented requirements that a provenance system should
support, such as veriﬁability, accountability, reproducibility, preservation, scal-
ability, generality, customisability, non-repudiation and distribution. They have
been of particular importance in motivating the design of our protocol. We now
identify several new requirements that are related to failures.
PReP does not specify well-deﬁned behaviour when recording documentation
in the presence of failures. For example, it assumes an actor always obtains an
acknowledgement from a provenance store for receiving a p-assertion and hence
does not consider the situation where the acknowledgement is lost or provenance
store crashes before storing that p-assertion. This may result in incomplete pro-
cess documentation, which requires us to design a robust protocol to meet the
following requirement:
Requirement 1 (Guaranteed Recording). After a process ﬁnishes
execution, the entire documentation of that process must eventually be recorded
in provenance store(s).
Distributed process documentation is connected by a chain of pointers (links)
to enable retrievability. Accurate pointers must exist even in the presence of
failures, leading to two requirements.
Requirement 2 (Viewlink Accuracy). Viewlinks recorded for each interac-
tion of a process must eventually be accurate in provenance stores. Each must
point to the store where the other actor in the same interaction recorded p-
assertions documenting that interaction.
Requirement 3 (Causelink Accuracy). Causelinks recorded during a pro-
cess must eventually be accurate in provenance stores. Each must point to the
store where p-assertions about the corresponding cause interaction were recorded.200 Z. Chen and L. Moreau
Creation and recording p-assertions have already introduced overhead into the
application [13]. The remedial actions speciﬁed by the protocol may however take
up computing resources and interfere with applications. In terms of recording
performance, we identify another two requirements:
Requirement 4 (Eﬃcient Recording). Recording p-assertions and taking
remedial actions should be eﬃcient and introduce minimum overhead.
Requirement 5 (Transparent Recording). Recording p-assertions and tak-
ing remedial actions should be transparent to the application.
Among the above requirements, requirements Guaranteed Recording, Viewlink
Accuracy and Causelink Accuracy are concerned with the protocol’s correctness,
which are to be proved in Section 5.
3 Protocol Description
We ﬁrstly outline the design philosophy of F PReP and state several assump-
tions, under which F PReP meets the requirements identiﬁed in Section 2.2.
Then, we deﬁne the protocol’s messages and describe the protocol.
3.1 Design
The goal of our work is to design a general protocol, i.e., application and im-
plementation independent, for recording process documentation in large, open
distributed environments where a large number of provenance stores are present
and failures may occur. Since PReP has provided an application independent so-
lution to recording process documentation, we decided to derive PReP in order
to inherit its generic nature.
There are several challenges in designing a distributed protocol that can cope
with failures. Firstly, we need to state an appropriate failure model and sys-
tematically identify system behaviour in the case of failures. Failures are non-
deterministic in nature and typically very hard to predict. Restricting our scope
to particularly failures is hence necessary. Secondly, the protocol may involve
the co-operation of several parties such as asserting actors, provenance stores,
and if necessary, additional components. Designing such a distributed protocol
is notoriously diﬃcult, since we have to stay in control of not only the normal
system behaviour when there is no failure but also of the complex situations
which can occur when failures happen.
We restrict ourselves to certain failures that may occur during the recording
of p-assertions into a provenance store.
Assumption 1. Provenance stores may crash, i.e., they halt and stop any fur-
ther execution, and can be restarted from their latest consistent state1.
1 The provenance store has been implemented as a stateless web service with a
database storage system. Hence the latest consistent state refers to the initial state
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Assumption 2. Messages to/from provenance stores can be lost, reordered but
not duplicated in communication channels.
We do not consider the failures of asserting actors and the exchange of applica-
tion messages since they are application dependant. Applications should provide
fault tolerance mechanisms to ensure asserting actors’ availability and reliable
exchange of application messages.
Assumption 3. An asserting actor has several provenance stores to use.
Given that we are considering an open system where there are a large number of
provenance stores, it is reasonable to make use of alternative stores to provide
fault tolerance.
We now analyse several failure types in a recording scenario where an asserting
actor sends a p-assertion (pa) to a provenance store (PS)a n dPS replies the
a c t o rw i t ha na c k n o w l e d g e m e n t( ack) after recording pa in its persistent storage.
– The message pa is lost;
– PS crashes before receiving pa;
– PS crashes after receiving pa and before recording pa;
– PS crashes after recording pa and before replying ack;
– The message ack is lost.
From an asserting actor’s perspective, all these failure types may lead to the
incapability of receiving an ack from a provenance store. An asserting actor can
set a timeout when waiting for an ack message. If the actor does not receive a
response within that time, it knows failures may have occurred; it can then send
the p-assertion again. We note that a low speed network or a provenance store
experiencing slowdown can also result in an expired timeout. Since a p-assertion
may be recorded in a provenance store even in the case of timeout, a provenance
store should be designed to handle duplicate p-assertions due to retransmission,
and always return the same acknowledgement for a speciﬁc p-assertion.
We identify several remedial actions that the protocol needs to take in the
presence of failures. The primary one is to resend a p-assertion to a provenance
store due to a timeout. After several reattempts, if the p-assertion still fails to be
acknowledged, an actor may use alternative stores to resubmit the p-assertion
until it is acknowledged. A successful receipt of an acknowledgement tells the
actor that the p-assertion being acknowledged has been recorded in a provenance
store.
Since distributed process documentation is connected using links to enable re-
trievability, the use of alternative provenance stores causes a link to the original
store incorrect. Hence, an asserting actor needs to take other remedial actions.
To satisfy Causelink Accuracy, it can maintain history information of using alter-
native stores during its participation in a process. The protocol checks an actor’s
causelinks when recording relationship p-assertions and updates them according
to the history information. To achieve Viewlink Accuracy, we introduce a novel
component, Update Coordinator, to facilitate viewlink updating. An update co-
ordinator is only involved when an alternative store is used, which means it does
not participate in every interaction, hence introducing small overhead.202 Z. Chen and L. Moreau
Assumption 4. The update coordinator does not fail.
We can use the traditional fault-tolerance mechanisms such as replication to
ensure its availability. This is feasible since we can have only one coordinator
per process and a coordinator maintains only a small amount of information,
as illustrated later. However, it is infeasible to use the replication mechanism
for provenance stores for two reasons. Firstly, we have assumed an open system
where there are a great number of provenance stores, it is hard to assume each
is facilitated with replicated backups. Secondly, though replication is sophisti-
cated, it comes with a signiﬁcant cost due to preserving the one-copy equivalence
property [23]. Given that the documentation produced in a process can be on the
order of terabytes [11], replication becomes very expensive and time consuming.
Therefore, compared with replicating provenance stores, the use of alternative
stores is a more general, simple and ﬂexible approach.
To meet requirements Eﬃcient Recording and Transparent Recording,F - P R e P
is designed to be an asynchronous protocol, allowing actors to send p-assertions
at any time. This means that actors can choose when to record p-assertions
without delaying their execution. Secondly, all p-assertions about one interac-
tion are submitted in a single batch and hence can be acknowledged using one
acknowledgement message, saving on the overhead of establishing network con-
nections. Thirdly, remedial actions, e.g., selecting alternative stores, are taken
by the protocol irrespective of the application.
3.2 Messages
F PReP is a distributed protocol, specifying the behaviour of actors (i.e., assert-
ing actors,provenance stores and update coordinator)and their communications.
It is deﬁned based on interaction i.e., the exchange of an application message
between a sender and receiver.
There are six messages in the protocol: Application Message (app), Interaction
Record Message (record), Record Ack Message (ack), Repair Message (repair),
Update Message (update), and Update Ack Message (uack). We now deﬁne each
message with Figure 2, which provides an example of actors exchanging these
messages.
Application Message. The application message app is exchanged by all ap-
plication actors. It contains application speciﬁc data needing to be transferred
between actors. In the context of a provenance system, the application message
is adapted to include interaction contextual information: an interaction key and
the sender’s ownlink.
An interaction key is generated by the sender in an interaction for uniquely
identifying the interaction from all other interactions. The receiver can then use
the same interaction key to record p-assertions about the same interaction.
In Figure 2, we assume that the key for the interaction where the sender, a,
sends an application message to the receiver, b,i si.W ea l s oa s s u m et h ed e f a u l t
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4. ack(i, S)3 .   record(i, S, a, PS2, pas)
1.app(d, i, PS1)
5. repair(i, S, PS2, PS1’)
8. record(i, R, b, PS1, pas)
6. update(i, S, PS1’)







(i, S) :<PS2, PS1’>
9. ack(i, R)
7. uack(i, S)
d:  Application Data
i:  Interaction Key
S, R: View Kind
a, b:  Actor Identity
PS1: Store Identity
pas:  P-assertions
Fig.2. Protocol Message Exchanges
sends an app to b containing application data d, interaction key i and a’s ownlink
to PS1 (Step 1). Upon receiving app, b becomes aware of its viewlink to PS1.
We assume that a’s viewlink to PS2 has been made available to a by means not
explained in the ﬁgure; the viewlink can be built into a at deployment time or
transferred to a in a response message or in an extra message from b.
Interaction Record Message. For each interaction, both actors document the
interaction by asserting p-assertions and sending them in an interaction record
message, record, to their respective provenance stores. The message contains: (1)
an interaction key, identifying the interaction being documented; (2) a view kind,
indicating the role of the asserting actor in the interaction, i.e., a sender or a re-
ceiver; (3) an actor identity, representing the asserting actor that documents the
interaction, which is essential for recording attributable process documentation;
(4) a viewlink of the asserting actor for that interaction; (5) a set of p-assertions
that describe the interaction.
In Figure 2, both a and b create a set of p-assertions, pas,a b o u tt h ei n t e r a c -
tion, i, and send them in record messages with their viewlink to PS2 and PS1,
respectively (Steps 3, 8). We note that the two record messages can be sent in
any order, not restricted by the step numbers in the ﬁgure.
The set of p-assertions must contain an interaction p-assertion to document
the exchange of an app message. If app is the consequence of receiving other
messages, then the sender of app must make a relationship p-assertion to capture
the causal connections between these messages.
Due to the asynchronous nature of the protocol, an asserting actor accumu-
lates record messages in a local queue and submits them to a provenance store
at its most convenient time. Before delivering a record message to a provenance
store, an actor checks all the relationship p-assertions in the message and up-
dates incorrect causelinks in order to meet Causelink Accuracy requirement.
These actions are detailed in Section 4.3.204 Z. Chen and L. Moreau
Record Ack Message. A provenance store acknowledges record message by
means of an acknowledgementmessage ack,o n l yafter it has successfully recorded
the content of record in its persistent storage. An ack message includes an inter-
action key and a view kind, indicating from which view of an interaction, a record
is being acknowledged. Therefore, one ack can acknowledge a set of p-assertions
in a record, which reduces communication overhead.
An asserting actor sets a timeout when waiting for an ack immediately after it
sends a record to a provenance store. This helps the actor take remedial actions
without waiting too long. If an ack is not received before the timeout, then the
actor resends the same record to the actor’s default store or an alternative store.
Only after receiving an ack acknowledging a record can the actor eliminate the
record from its local queue. An ack means that the acknowledged record message
has been processed and recorded in a provenance store persistently.
In Figure 2, a sends a record to its default store PS1 (Step 2) but does not
receive an ack before a timeout. Then it selects another store PS1  to use (Step
3) and ﬁnally receives an ack (Step 4).
Repair Message. An asserting actor sends a repair message, repair, to an up-
date coordinator to request an update of the other actor’s viewlink. It consists
of four elements: (1) an interaction key, indicating in which interaction the op-
posite actor’s viewlink is to be updated; (2) the asserting actor’s view kind in
the interaction; (3) a pointer (DestPS) to the provenance store recording the
opposite actor’s viewlink in the interaction; (4) the actor’s ownlink, pointing to
the provenance store from which the actor received an ack for that interaction.
An actor issues a repair r e q u e s to n l yi fi tu s e da na l t e r n a t i v es t o r ei na n
interaction, which results in the other actor’s viewlink incorrect. In Figure 2,
the sender sends its record to the alternative store PS1  (Step 3) and receives an
ack (Step 4). As a consequence, the receiver’s viewlink to PS1 becomes incorrect,
hence requiring an update. In order not to interfere with applications to support
Transparent Recording requirement, the protocol does not allow the sender to
directly inform the receiver with its new ownlink, which is now pointing to PS1 .
Instead, the sender requests an update coordinator (Step 5) to help update the
receiver’s provenance store (Step 6).
An update coordinator is necessary since both sender and receiver may issue
a repair request in an interaction. This cannot be achieved by direct update of
the other actor’s provenance store, because at that moment, one does not know
which store the opposite actor is actually using. In Figure 2, if the receiver uses
an alternative store to record its p-assertions, then the sender’s viewlink to PS2
becomes incorrect as well. In that case, the receiver needs to issue another repair
request to the coordinator.
Since an update coordinatoris not involvedin everyinteraction,werecommend
that all the application actors participating in a process employ one coordinator.
If using more than one, then any two actors exchanging an application message
must share the same one in order to ensure Viewlink Accuracy requirement.
The identiﬁer of a coordinator can be built in actors or exchanged to other actors
in the application message app. Figure 2 employs the former approach.Recording Process Documentation in the Presence of Failures 205
We do not consider the loss of repair messages in channel, which can be solved
by using an extra acknowledgement message and retransmission actions. As-
sumption 4 implies that a repair request can always be processed by an update
coordinator.
Update Message. The update coordinator sends an update message, update,
to a provenance store in order to update a viewlink in that store. The message
contains: (1) an interaction key, indicating for which interaction, the opposite
actor’s viewlink needs to be updated; (2) the view kind of the asserting actor
that issued a repair request for that interaction; (3) the ownlink of the requesting
actor. The DestPS ﬁeld in the repair message tells the update coordinator where
to send the update message.
In order to deal with the case where botha c t o r si na ni n t e r a c t i o ne a c hi s s u ea
repair request, which can be in any order, the update coordinator maintains re-
quest information: the identity of the destination store, speciﬁed by the DestPS
ﬁeld in the repair message, and the requesting actor’s ownlink. This request in-
formation is indexed by the pair of interaction key and view kind. In Figure 2,
after receiving a repair request from the sender, the coordinator records a tuple
(PS2,PS1 ) indexed by the pair (i, S). Then the coordinator sends to store PS2
an update message containing the sender’s ownlink to PS1  (Step 6). Therefore,
the receiver’s viewlink stored in PS2 is replaced with PS1  and hence becomes
correct.
If the update coordinator receives two repair messages each from one asserting
actor in an interaction, then it sends out two update messages after performing
operations using the stored request information to ensure that both update mes-
sages are delivered to correct destination stores. We detail the coordinator’s
internal behaviour in Section 4.5.
We note that a provenance store may receive an update and a record message
in any order (Steps 6, 8). The protocol speciﬁes that the viewlink obtained from
update is NOT overwritten by the one from record in order to achieve Viewlink
Accuracy requirement.
Update Ack Message. After updating a viewlink in a provenance store, the
store returns an acknowledgement message uack, containing an interaction key
and a view kind, to the update coordinator acknowledging the respective update
message. Since update or uack messages may be lost in channel according to
Assumption 2, the coordinator sets a timeout when waiting for a uack and an
expired timeout leads to resending the same update message.
4 Protocol Formalisation
F PReP has been formalised through the use of an abstract state machine
(ASM). The ASM notation we adopt has been used previously to describe a
distributed reference counting algorithm [22] and a fault-tolerant directory ser-
vice for mobile agents [21]. The abstract machine characterises the behaviour206 Z. Chen and L. Moreau
of actors with respect to the messages they send and receive. This behaviour
is speciﬁed by the permissible transitions that the ASM is allowed to perform.
Such a formalisation provides a precise, implementation-independent means of
describing the system.
We begin by describing the state space of the ASM, and then proceed to
discuss its transitions. Finally, we detail the behaviour of each kind of actors.
4.1 System State Space
Figure 3 shows the system state space. We identify speciﬁc subsets of actors in
the system, namely, the senders, the receivers, provenance stores, and update
coordinators. The set of each of protocol messages is deﬁned formally as an
inductive type. For example, the set of Application Messages is deﬁned by an
inductive type whose constructor is app and whose parameters are from the
set of DATA, IK and OL. The notation DATA refers to the set of application
related data. The set of all protocol messages (M) is deﬁned as the union of these
message sets. Messages are exchanged over a set of communication channels, K.
Since no assumption is made about message order in communication channels,
K is represented as bags of messages between pairs of actors. The power set
notation (P) denotes that there can be more than one of a given element.
We deﬁne the set of relationship p-assertions as an inductive type whose
constructor is rel-pa. The names of relationships are given in the set REL. Since
a relationship p-assertion captures causal connections between eﬀect interaction
and cause interaction(s), we use the set EID and CID to index the respective
interactions, each containing the interaction’s key (IK)a n dt h er o l e( VK)t h a t
the actor plays in that interaction. With EID or CID, the p-assertions about a
related interaction can be found in a local provenance store or a remote store
(indicated by a causelink from the set CL). The set of interaction p-assertions
can be constructed by i-pa whose parameter is from the set IK and application
data set DATA. Since actor state p-assertions are not used in the formalisation,
we do not model them to simplify the state space. The set of all kinds of p-
assertions (PA) is deﬁned as the union of these p-assertion sets.
The internal functionality of each kind of actors is modelled as follows.
Sender and Receiver State Space. An asserting actor (indexed by an as-
serter identity) uses various tables (in T ∈ IN, asserter T ∈ ASSERTER,
log T ∈ LOG, queue T ∈ QUEUE, lc ∈ LC and timer T ∈ TIMER) to record
p-assertions into a provenance store. A table maps a key to a tuple. For example,
the table (asserter T) maps an interaction key (κ ∈ IK) and the actor’s view
kind (v ∈ VK) to a tuple of four elements: the state of an interaction record
message during recording (str ∈ STR), the actor’s ownlink (ol ∈ OL), viewlink
(vl ∈ VL) and the p-assertions created in the interaction (P(PA)).
As all the data that an asserting actor works upon is located in received mes-
sages, these incoming messages and interaction keys identifying these messages
are stored in a table (in T), which is used when creating p-assertions.Recording Process Documentation in the Presence of Failures 207
A = {a1,...,a n} (Set of Actor Identities)
SID ⊆ A (Sender Identities)
RID ⊆ A (Receiver Identities)
PID ⊆ A (Provenance Store Identities)
CID ⊆ A (Coordinator Identities)
M = app : DATA × IK × OL →M (Set of Protocol Messages)
| record : IK × VK × A × VL × P(PA) →M
| ack : IK × VK →M
| repair : IK × VK × DESTPS × OL →M
| update : IK × VK × OL →M
| uack : IK × VK →M
K = A × A → Bag(M) (Set of Channels)
R = {m ∈M | m = record(κ,v,a,vl,pas)} (Set of Interaction Records)
IK = SID × RID × N (Set of Interaction Keys)
VK = {S, R} (Set of ViewKinds)
OL = PID (Set of Ownlinks)
VL = PID (Set of Viewlinks)
DESTPS = PID (Set of Destination Stores)
PA = rel-pa : REL × EID × P(CID) → PA (Set of P-Assertions)
| i-pa : IK × DATA → PA
REL = {r1,...,r n} (Set of Business Logic Descriptions)
EID = IK × VK (Set of EﬀectIDs)
CID = CL × IK × VK (Set of CauseIDs)
CL = PID (Set of CauseLinks)
IN = A → P(IK × DATA) (Set of In Tables)
ASSERTER = A → IK × VK → STR⊥ × OL⊥ × VL⊥ × P(PA) (Set of Asserting Actors)
LOG = A → IK × VK → CHANGED⊥ × APS⊥ (Set of Log Tables)
QUEUE = A → Queue(R) (Set of Record Queues)
LC = A → N (Sender’s Local Counts)
PSLIST = A → P(PID) (Set of Alternative Store Lists)
STR = {READY,SEND,SENT,ACKED,OK} (States of Interaction Record)
CHANGED = {TRUE,FALSE} (Flags of using alternative PS))
APS = PID (Set of Alternative Stores Used)
TIMER = A → IK × VK → STATUS⊥ × TIMEOUT (Set of Timers)
STATUS = {ENABLED,DISABLED} (Set of Timer Statuses)
TIMEOUT = N (Set of Timeouts)
PS = PID → IK × VK → A⊥ × VL⊥ × P(PA) (Set of Provenance Stores)
C = CID → IK × VK → DESTPS⊥ × OL⊥ (Set of Coordinators)
UPDATE = CID → IK × VK → STATE⊥ (Set of Update Tables)
STATE = {UPDATE,SENT,UPDATED,F} (Set of Update States)
SC = IN × ASSERTER × QUEUE × LOG × LC ×
TIMER×PS × C × UPDATE ×K (Set of Conﬁgurations)
Characteristic Variables:
a ∈ A, as ∈ SID, ar ∈ RID, aps ∈ PID, ac ∈ CID, m ∈M , k ∈K , d ∈ DATA, κ ∈ IK, v ∈ VK,
ol ∈ OL, vl ∈ VL, adps ∈ DESTPS, pa ∈ PA, pas ∈P (PA), content ∈ CONTENT, r ∈ REL,
cids ∈P(CID), cl ∈ CL, in T ∈ IN, asserter T ∈ ASSERTER, log T ∈ LOG, queue T ∈ QUEUE,
lc ∈ LC, psList ∈ PSLIST, str ∈ STR, changed ∈ CHANGED, aps ∈ APS, timer T ∈ TIMER,
status ∈ STATUS, to ∈ TIMEOUT, store T ∈ PS, coord T ∈ C, update T ∈ UPDATE, c ∈ SC
Initial State of Conﬁguration:
ci =  in Ti,asserter Ti,log Ti,queue Ti,lc i,timer Ti,store Ti,coord Ti,update Ti,k i 
where:
asserter Ti = λaκv ·  ⊥ ,⊥,⊥,∅ , log Ti = λaκv ·  ⊥ ,⊥ , queue Ti = λa ·∅ ,
lci = λa · 0, timer Ti = λaκ ·  ⊥ ,0 , store Ti = λaκv ·  ⊥ ,⊥,∅ ,
coord Ti = λaκv ·  ⊥ ,⊥ , update Ti = λaκv ·  ⊥ , ki = λaiaj ·∅
in Ti = λa ·∅
Fig.3. System State Space208 Z. Chen and L. Moreau
T h el o gt a b l e( log T) maintains history information of using alternative stores
in an asserting actor, used for updating causelinks. A ﬂag (changed ∈
CHANGED)i ss e tt oTRUE if an alternative store was used. The identiﬁer
of the ﬁnal store from which an actor received acknowledgment is remembered
in a ﬁeld (aps ∈ APS). So that an asserting actor knows which store recorded
its p-assertions about an interaction.
After creating interaction records, an actor accumulates them in a local queue,
modelled by the table (queue T), before shipping them to a provenance store.
The FIFO property of the queue guarantees successful update of causelinks,
detailed later. The notation (LC) deﬁnes a function mapping a sender identiﬁer
to a natural number so as to distinguish interactions between the sender and
receiver. The sender needs to ensure that the natural number is locally unique
on the sender side in each interaction. The list of alternative provenance stores
are modelled by the set PSLIST, mapping an actor’s identity to a set of store
identities.
The timer table (timer T) models the timer used by asserting actors and
update coordinators when waiting for acknowledgement messages. The timer’s
state (status ∈ STATUS) indicates if the timer is enabled or disabled. A timeout
(to ∈ TIMEOUT) is a natural number, which counts down to zero after the
timer is enabled.
PS and Coordinator State Space. The set PS models provenance stores,
each containing a table (store T) indexed by a provenance store’s identity. The
table maps an interaction key and the view kind of the asserter that created and
recorded p-assertions in the interaction to a tuple: the identity of the asserter,
a viewlink and the set of p-assertions documenting the interaction. The set C
models update coordinators. A update coordinator maintains repair request in-
formation in a table (coord T) and the states of updating a viewlink in another
table (update T ∈ UPDATE). We will further detail these tables when we de-
scribe the rules of a provenance store and update coordinator.
Given the state space, the ASM is described by an initial state and a set
of transitions. A transition is the application of a rule to one conﬁguration to
achieve another conﬁguration. Figure 3 contains the initial state (ci ∈ SC),
which can be summarised as empty channels, empty tables and any local counters
being initialised to zero in all actors. The ASM proceeds from this initial state
through its execution by going through transitions that lead to new states. These
transitions are deﬁned below by the rules of the state machine.
State Machine Rules. The state machine rules are represented using the
following notation.
rule name(v1,v 2,...):
condition1(v1,v 2,...)∧ condition2(v1,v 2,...) ∧ ...
→{




Rules are identiﬁed by their name and a number of parameters that the rule
operates over. Any number of conditions must be met for a rule to ﬁre. Once a
rule’s conditions are met, the rule ﬁres. The execution of a rule is atomic, so that
no other rule may interrupt or interleave with an executing rule. This maintains
the consistency of the ASM. A new state is achieved after applying all the rule’s
pseudo-statements to the state that met the conditions of the rule.
We use send and receive and table update pseudo-statements. Informally,
send(m,a1,a 2) inserts a message m into the communication channel from actor
a1 to actor a2,a n dreceive(m,a1,a 2) removes m from the channel. The table
update operation puts a message into a table or changes content state in a
table. We use the notation table T to refer to any table in the system state
space. Formally, send, receive and table update pseudo-statements act as state
transformers and are deﬁned as follows.
– If k is the set of message channels of a state  ...,k , then the expression
send(m,a1,a 2) denotes the state  ...,k  ,w h e r e 2 k (a1,a 2)=k(a1,a 2)⊕m,
and k (ai,a j)=k(ai,a j),∀(ai,a j)  =( a1,a 2).
– If k is the set of message channels of a state  ...,k , then the expression
receive(m,a1,a 2) denotes the state  ...,k  ,w h e r ek (a1,a 2)=k(a1,a 2) m,
and k (ai,a j)=k(ai,a j),∀(ai,a j)  =( a1,a 2).
– If table T is a component of state  ...,tableT,... , then the expression
table T(...).y := V denotes the state  ...,tableT  ,... ,w h e r etable T  
(...).x = table T(...).x if x  = y,a n dtable T  (...).y := V .
To manipulate an asserting actor’s queue, which is used for accumulating
interaction records, we deﬁne the following operations: head(q), enqueue(m,q)
and dequeue(q).
– The expression head(q) returns the head element of queue q.
– The expression enqueue(m,q) denotes q := q m,w h i c hm e a n sm is added
at the tail of queue q.
– The expression dequeue(q) denotes q := tail(q), which means the head of
queue q is removed.
For convenience, we use notation a ← b to bind a local variable a t oav a l u e
b. We then deﬁne an assignment operator := for tables. It can assign a value to
a ﬁeld of a table, or assign a tuple to a table as in the following example. In
this example, the second ﬁeld of asserter T(a,κ,v), i.e., the ownlink ol,i sn o t
assigned when ∗ is present.




asserter T(a,κ,v).str := OK
asserter T(a,κ,v).vl := PS2
asserter T(a,κ,v).pas := pas
2 We use the operators ⊕ and   to denote union and diﬀerence on bags.210 Z. Chen and L. Moreau
Having deﬁned the system state space and ASM rules, we now introduce the
rules for asserters (the senders and receivers), provenance stores and update
coordinators. These rules precisely deﬁne these actors’ internal behaviour.
4.2 Asserter Rules in Exchanging Phase
An asserting actor’s behaviour can be summarised as two phases: Exchanging
and Recording. We ﬁrstly describe the Exchanging phase and then introduce the
rules of the Recording phase in Section 4.3.
The sender and receiver in an interaction have diﬀerent rules in the Exchang-
ing phase (Figure 4 and Figure 5). The sender exchanges to the receiver an
application message app including application data (d), an interaction key (κ)
and the sender’s ownlink (i.e., the receiver’s viewlink, vl). After receiving an app
message, the receiver adds κ and d into table (in T). Both actor document the
exchange of app and an interaction record message is then produced and accu-
mulated in a queue (queue T). This buﬀering of interaction records is designed
to meet Transparent Recording and Eﬃcient Recording requirements. It reduces
the performance penalty upon the application by allowing the actor to send
interaction records when convenient. An asserting actor also initialises several
tables, used in the Recording phase.
send app(as,a r,a ps,vl,d,r):
//triggered when d, produced by a function
//described by r,i st ob es e n tb yas to ar,
//and when the viewlink, vl,i sa v a i l a b l e .
→{




asserter T(as,κ,S): = READY,a ps,vl,pas ;
log T(as,κ,S): = FALSE,⊥ ;
}
Fig.4. The Sender’s Rules (Ex-
changing Phase)
receive app(as,a r,a ps,d,κ,vl):
app(d,κ,vl) ∈ k(as,a r)
→{
receive(app(d,κ,vl),a s,a r);
in T(ar): =in T(ar) ⊕  κ,d ;
pas ← createPA(as,κ,d,⊥);
enqueue(record(κ,R,ar,vl,pas),queue T(ar));
asserter T(ar,κ,R): = READY,a ps,vl,pas ;
log T(ar,κ,R): = FALSE,⊥ ;
// business logic
}
Fig.5. The Receiver’s Rules (Ex-
changing Phase)
The function newIdentifier(as,a r) creates a globally unique interaction key,
as deﬁned by the following pseudo function. This function requires that senders
are responsible for creating interaction keys. This function takes the identities
of the sender and the receiver as inputs. It then obtains the local counter of the
sender and increases it by one. Finally, a new interaction key using the two actor
identities and the local counter is constructed and returned.
Deﬁnition
newIdentifier : SID × RID → IK
newIdentifier(as,a r):
lc(as): =lc(as)+1 ;
return  as,a r,lc(as) ;Recording Process Documentation in the Presence of Failures 211
In order to deﬁne function createPA(a,κ,d,r), we ﬁrstly deﬁne a function
cause(a,d,r). It takes an actor identity (a), application data (d), and a business
description (r) as input and ﬁnds interaction keys of all causes that are related
to the production of d.
Deﬁnition
cause : A × DATA × REL → P(IK)
cause(a,d,r):
let fr be a function described by r, such that fr(args)=d,
where args = { κ,d  |  κ,d  ∈in T(a)};
return {κ |  κ,d  ∈args};
Recall that in Figure 5, the data received from application messages is stored
in table in T.I ncause(a,d,r), we assume there exists a function fr that takes
some data d  from in T as input and produces a result data d.T h e ncause(a,d,r)
returns the keys of interactions where all the input data is received.
The createPA(a,κ,d,r) function is deﬁned as follows. It takes an actor iden-
tity (a), an interaction key (κ), application data (d), and a business logic de-
scription (r) to create a set of p-assertions documenting the interaction (indexed
by κ)i nw h i c hd is transferred.
Deﬁnition
createPA : A × IK × DATA × REL → P(PA)
createPA(a,κ,d,r):
pas ← if r = ⊥
{i-pa(κ,d)};
{i-pa(κ,d),rel-pa(r, κ,S ,cids)},
where cids = { cl,κ ,R |κ  ∈ cause(a,d,r) and cl = asserter T(a,κ ,R).ol};
return pas;
In createPA(a,κ,d,r), the created p-assertions must at least include an in-
teraction p-assertion documenting the exchange of an application message that
contains κ and d.I fd is the consequence of receiving other messages, i.e., r  = ⊥,
then the sender must make a relationship p-assertion3 to capture the causal
connections between these messages. Function cause(a,d,r) is used here to ﬁnd
keys of cause interactions when creating a relationship p-assertion. An asserting
actor may create other application dependent p-assertions, which are not shown
in the deﬁnition.
4.3 Asserter Rules in Recording Phase
In Recording phase, an asserting actor sends queued record messages to a prove-
nance store and takes remedial actions in response to timeouts. To facilitate pre-
sentation, we assume each asserting actor employs a Recording Manager (RM),
which monitors the actor’s queue and submits record messages to a provenance
store. The behaviour of RM is speciﬁedi nF i g u r e6a n ds u m m a r i s e dn o w .
3 A relationship p-assertion is always created and recorded in the context of its eﬀect
interaction.212 Z. Chen and L. Moreau
pre check(a,κ,v,vl,pas):
queue T(a)  = ∅∧record(κ,v,a,vl,pas)=head(queue T(a)) ∧ asserter T(a,κ,v).str = READY
→{
for each pa ∈ pas, such that pa = rel-pa(r
, κ,v ,ci ds
)





















, κ,v ,ci ds
);
pas
 ← pas   pa ⊕ pa
;
if pas
  = ⊥
asserter T(a,κ,v): = ∗,∗,∗,pas
 ;
asserter T(a,κ,v).str := SEND;
}
send record(a,κ,v,vl,pas,to):
queue T(a)  = ∅∧record(κ,v,a,vl,pas)=head(queue T(a)) ∧ asserter T(a,κ,v).str = SEND
→{
aps ← asserter T(a,κ,v).ol;
send(record(κ,v,a,vl,pas),a ,a ps);
timer T(a,κ,v): = ENABLED,to ;
asserter T(a,κ,v).str := SENT;
}
timer click(a, κ,v):
timer T(a,κ,v).status = ENABLED
→{
timer T(a,κ,v).to := timer T(a,κ,v).to − 1;
}
timeout ack(a,κ,v):





log T(a,κ,v).changed := TRUE;
timer T(a,κ,v): = DISABLED,0 ;





ack(κ,v) ∈ k(a, aps)
→{
receive(ack(κ,v),a ,a ps);
ol ← asserter T(a,κ,v).ol;
if (timer T(a,κ,v).to > 0 ∧ aps = ol ∧ asserter T(a,κ,v).str = SENT), then
dequeue(queue T(a));
timer T(a,κ,v): = DISABLED,0 ;
asserter T(a,κ,v).str := ACKED;
}
post check(a, ac,κ,v):
asserter T(a,κ,v).str = ACKED
→{
if (log T(a,κ,v).changed), then
aps ← asserter T(a,κ,v).ol;
adps ← asserter T(a, κ,v).vl;
send(repair(κ,v, adps,a ps),a,a c);
log T(a,κ,v).aps := aps;
asserter T(a,κ,v).str := OK;
}
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– Updating causelinks.G i v e narecord message from the queue (queue T(a)),
RM checks and updates causelinks in all relationship p-assertions included
in the message (rule pre check). A log table (log T) maintains a history of
the use of alternative provenance stores for each interaction. If the log table
shows that an alternative store was used to record p-assertions about a cause
interaction, then the corresponding causelink is updated.
– Submitting a record message. RM sends a record message to a provenance
store and sets timeout when waiting for an ack message (rule send record).
– Resubmitting a record message. If RM does not receive an ack when the
timeout expires (rule timeout ack), then it infers that failures may have
occurred. In this case, RM may resend the record to the same store or use
an alternative store if retry attempts to the old store also failed. In order to
simplify rules, we do not formalise resending messages to a same provenance
store; instead, a new store is selected once a timeout expires. The function
random(psList(a)) returns an alternative store’s identity, selected from a
list of candidates. There can be various ways of selecting a store from a list
of stores. Here we randomly select one to use.
Only after an ack is received, can RM eliminate the acknowledged record
from the queue (rule receive ack). Checking the state str as well as the
identiﬁer of the provenance store from which an ack is received help detect
duplicate acknowledgements, preserving the correcness of the protocol (rule
receive ack).
– Requesting to update viewlinks.I fa na l t e r n a t i v es t o r e was used to record a
record message, the actor’s ownlink known to the opposite actor in an inter-
action becomes invalid, since the actor’s store has changed. Therefore, RM
requests a update coordinator to update the opposite actor’s viewlink by
sending a repair message (rule post check). We note that for a given inter-
action, an asserting actor at most sends one repair request, which minimises
the overhead of taking remedial actions.
– Updating log table.I fa na l t e r n a t i v es t o r e was used to record a record message,
RM sets log T(a,κ,v).changed to TRUE (rule timeout ack). After a record
message is successfully recorded in a provenance store, RM remembers the
provenance store’s identity in the log table if log T(a,κ,v).changed is TRUE
(rule post check). This information is to be used for updating causelinks as
described above.
We note that the FIFO property of the queue guarantees successful update of
causelinks. This is because rule send app and rule receive app enforce that an
actor always makes p-assertions about a cause interaction, i.e., where it receives
a message, before an eﬀect interaction, i.e., where it sends another message as
consequence of received messages. This implies that the record messages about
cause interactions are always placed into the queue before that about the eﬀect
interaction. Therefore, by monitoring the use of alternative stores when sending
record messages, causelinks can be updated successfully. Although current mod-
elling indicates that there is only one queue per asserting actor, which is highly
sequential, it can be relaxed by adding a process identiﬁer to queue T(a). Then,214 Z. Chen and L. Moreau
each process that an actor participates in can utilise a queue, which enables
parallel recording.
4.4 Provenance Store Rules
Figure 7 gives provenance store’s rules. A provenance store replies an ack message
only after it has processed a record message (rule receive record). A store checks
if p-assertions about a given interaction exists before processing a record message.





if (store T(aps,κ ,v).pas = ∅),t h e n
store T(aps,κ,v): = a,∗,pas ;
if (store T(aps,κ ,v).vl = ⊥),t h e n




update(κ,v,ol) ∈ k(ac,a ps)
→{
receive(update(κ,v,ol),a c,a ps);
store T(aps,κ,v).vl := ol;
send(uack(κ,v),a ps,a c);
}
Fig.7. Provenance Store rules
Since a provenance store may receive an update and a record message related
to a same interaction in any order, to achieve requirement Viewlink Accuracy,
the viewlink obtained from record must NOT overwrite any existing one which
may come from an update.
The notation v in rule receive update stands for the opposite view in an
interaction. For example, if v is the view of the sender, then v represents the
view of the receiver.
An actor selects an alternative store to record p-assertions if an ack is not
received within a timeout. However, it may be the case that the original store still
receives and records those p-assertions. This may lead to duplicate information
in several stores though, it does not aﬀect the correctness of the protocol, since
only the p-assertions successfully acknowledged by an ack can be retrieved using
the links updated by the protocol.
4.5 Coordinator Rules
The update coordinator’s rules are shown in Figure 8. Upon receiving a repair
request (rule receive repair), if there exists request information from the op-
posite view with regard to the same interaction, which means the coordinator
has received a repair message from the other actor, then the coordinator replaces
one actor’s destination store with the other’s ownlink, thus making each actor’s
destination store correct. Then the update coordinator dispatches two update
messages to their respective new destination stores by setting update status to
UPDATE (rule send update).
Since a crashing provenance store can be restarted, resending update messages
to a same provenance store can be eventually successful (rule timeout uackRecording Process Documentation in the Presence of Failures 215
receive repair(aps,a dps,a c,κ,v,v,ol):
repair(κ,v, adps,ol) ∈ k(aps,a c)
→{
receive(repair(κ,v,adps,ol),a ps,a c);
if (coord T(ac,κ,v)=⊥),t h e n
coord T(ac,κ,v): = adps,ol ;
update T(ac,κ,v): =UPDATE;
if (coord T(ac,κ ,v)  = ⊥),t h e n
a

dps ← coord T(ac,κ,v).ol;
coord T(ac,κ,v): = a

dps,∗ ;






 adps,ol ←coord T(ac,κ,v);
send(update(κ,v,ol),a c,a dps);
timer T(ac,κ ,v): = ENABLED,to ;
update T(ac,κ ,v): =SENT;
}
timer click(ac,κ,v):
timer T(ac,κ ,v).status = ENABLED
→{
timer T(ac,κ,v).to := timer T(ac,κ,v).to − 1;
}
timeout uack(ac,κ,v):
timer T(ac,κ ,v).status = ENABLED∧
timer T(ac,κ ,v).to ≤ 0
→{
update T(ac,κ,v): =UPDATE;
timer T(ac,κ,v): = DISABLED,0 ;
}
receive uack(aps,a c,κ,v):
uack(κ,v) ∈ k(aps,a c)
→{
receive(uack(κ,v),a ps,a c);
if (timer T(ac,κ,v).to > 0)then
if (aps = coord T(ac,κ,v).adps), then




sets update T(ac,κ,v)t oUPDATE, which will resend update message in rule
send update.). This ensures that all requested viewlinks in provenace stores can
be updated.
In the current design, we do not specify removing request information main-
tained in an update coordinator. Request information with regard to an inter-
action can only be eliminated after the coordinator successfully updates the
provenance store in each view of the interaction. If there exists request informa-
tion for only one view, then the coordinator cannot delete it since it may receive
another repair request from the other view. Given that an actor sends out a
repair message for an interaction within ﬁnite time (due to the use of timeouts in
Figure 6), the coordinator can remove any request information with correspond-
ing update status being UPDATED after a reasonably long period of time since
the information is recorded. As illustrated above, request information with an
update status F cannot be removed.
5P r o t o c o l A n a l y s i s
Based on the ASM above, we now analyse F PReP. The requirements Guaran-
teed Recording, Viewlink Accuracy and CauseLink Accuracy, identiﬁed in Section
2.2, are concerned with the protocol’s correctness. We prove that the three re-
quirements are satisﬁed when the protocol terminates in each interaction. Given
that a process consists of a set of interactions, if the protocol can ensure that
for each interaction, the three requirements are supported, then the documenta-
tion of the whole process is guaranteed to be recorded and retrievable. We have
proved the protocol terminates under the assumptions stated in Section 3.1. We
now formalise the three requirements as properties and outline the proof of these
properties.216 Z. Chen and L. Moreau
Theorem 1 (Guaranteed Recording). When the protocol terminates, the
documentation produced by each asserting actor about the interaction is recorded
in provenance stores.
For any reachable conﬁguration c and for any a, κ, v, the following implication
holds when the ASM terminates:
If asserter T(a,κ,v).str  = ⊥,t h e n
store T(aps,κ,v)= a,vl,asserter T(a,κ,v).pas ,
such that vl  = ⊥ and aps = asserter T(a,κ,v).ol. 
Theorem 2 (Viewlink Accuracy). When the protocol terminates, each as-
serter’s viewlink of an interaction is accurate in its provenance store. The
viewlink points to the store where the other actor in the interaction recorded
p-assertions about the same interaction.
For any a, a , κ, v, then the following implication holds when the ASM termi-
nates:
if asserter T(a,κ,v).str  = ⊥,t h e n
store T(aps,κ,v).vl = asserter T(a ,κ,v).ol,
such that aps = asserter T(a,κ,S).ol. 
Theorem 3 (Causelink Accuracy). When the protocol terminates, an as-
serter’s causelinks are accurate in its provenance store. Each points to the store
where p-assertions about the corresponding cause interaction are recorded.
For any a, κ, v, then the following must hold when the protocol terminates:
if asserter T(a,κ,v).str  = ⊥,t h e n
for any pa ∈ store T(aps,κ,v).pas, such that pa = rel-pa(rel, κ,v ,cids),
for any c ∈ cids,l e t cl ,κ  ,v   = c,
cl  = asserter T(a,κ ,v ).ol.
such that aps = asserter T(a,κ,v).ol. 
Due to space restriction, we now outline our proof of these properties. Given
an arbitrary valid conﬁguration of the ASM, our proofs typically proceed by
induction on the length of the transitions that lead to the conﬁguration, and
by a case analysis on the kind of transitions. We show that a property is true
in the initial conﬁguration of the machine and remains true for every possible
transition. This kind of proof is systematic, less error prone and avoids the
complications of temporal reasoning.
6 Related Work
Much research has been seen to support recording process documentation, such
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their execution environment or speciﬁc technologies. The drawback is that the
recorded documentation lacks interoperability and hence cannot be shared by
diﬀerent organisations. To promote interoperability, Groth et al. [15] proposed
an application and technology independent approach to modelling process doc-
umentation in the context of SOAs and developed a generic recording protocol,
PReP. All the surveyed systems however do not deal with failures. F PReP
preserves the application and technology independent nature and provides well-
deﬁned behaviour while recording documentation in the case of failures.
Redundancy has been widely used to provide fault-tolerance for distributed
systems [4]. It involves replicating data or system functionalities, and repeating
messages or operations. We adopt the redundancy mechanism in our work, e.g.,
replicating update coordinators and retransmitting messages. Provenance stores
are not suitable to be replicated due to the complexity and signiﬁcant cost of
replicating documentation as explained before.
Atomic transactions typically requires all-or-nothing property to maintain
system consistency [12]. It can be an alternative solution to our work. We now
discuss a scenario where atomic transaction is applied. We assume that an as-
serting actor and its provenance store are the two participants in a transaction
of recording p-assertions. If the provenance store fails, the actor is notiﬁed that
the transaction is aborted. Then the actor can select another store to use until
the transaction is complete. In this case, the use of atomic transaction provides
similar functionality as the remedial actions in our protocol, i.e., selecting an
alternative store upon an expired timeout. This approach however is too compli-
cated to be adopted by the fact that each interaction leads to two transactions
(sender/receiver).
Formal methods are mathematically-based techniques for the speciﬁcation,
development and veriﬁcation of software and hardware systems. There are three
rigorous methods, Abstract State Machines (ASM) [17], B[2] and Z[1], that share
a common conceptual foundation and are widely used in both academia and
industry for the design and analysis of hardware and software systems.
Applying formal methods to the design and reasoning of fault-tolerance has
been studied in distributed systems, e.g., distributed database systems[25], con-
trol systems[18], and mobile agent systems[19]. The ASM notation we adopt
has been used previously to describe a fault-tolerant directory service for mobile
agents[21] and PReP. Our proof follows a systematic procedure based on math-
ematical induction. While done by hand, we believe it is suﬃcient to provide
conﬁdence that the protocol does conform to the properties in Section 5. Pre-
vious experience has shown that the ASM formalism is suitable for mechanical
proof derivations, and several algorithms[21] have been carried out using a Coq
theorem prover[5].
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have presented a generic protocol, F PReP, for recording pro-
cess documentation in the presence of failures. By deriving PReP, F PReP not218 Z. Chen and L. Moreau
only keeps the generic nature, but also guarantees that process documentation
is recorded in the presence of failures. Also, it enables the retrievability of dis-
tributed documentation in large scale distributed environments where failures
may occur. The protocol is systematically designed and meets the requirements,
identiﬁed in Section 2, under the assumptions we state on failures.
Our ASM-based formalisation provides a precise and implementation inde-
pendent means of specifying the protocol. Firstly, it sketches the essence of
the protocol and accurately deﬁnes required actor’s behaviour with unnecessary
message ﬁelds or messages removed. Secondly, it promotes a rigorous design of
the protocol and helps us better understanding the complex behaviour of actors
in the presence of failures. With such a formal description, we have success-
fully identiﬁed several deﬁciencies in the early design of the protocol. Thirdly,
the code-like speciﬁcation is independent of any given programming language
or implementation. This enables our protocol to be implemented using diﬀer-
ent languages and technologies. In summary, the use of a formal notation has
signiﬁcantly improved the design of F PReP.
F PReP has been implemented in Java and integrated into a client side p-
assertion recording library developed by the University of Southampton. Its per-
formance has been evaluated and the result reveals that it introduces acceptable
overhead [7]. We are currently investigating how to create process documentation
when an application has its own fault tolerance schemes to tolerate application
level failures. In future work, we plan to make use of the process documentation
recorded in the presence of failures to diagnose failures.
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